The purpose is to analyze the cognitive neural mechanism in economic decision-making. This study adopts gambling task, manipulation probability and change of potency to systematically explore the cognitive process of economic decision-making when the expected value is equal to, smaller than, and greater than the reference value. It is found that the influence of probability on individual's decision-making is bigger when the expected value is greater than or equal to the reference value. When the expected value is smaller than the reference value, the individual tends to consider the probability and the potency (i.e. the expected value) simultaneously in decisionmaking. The conclusions have been drawn that the brain activation data of PCC can be well fitted with the behavior data (acceptance rate) under the condition of high, middle and low potency, which indicates that it may be a sensitive brain region for the evaluation of potency; and the negative emotion in insula plays an important regulating role in decision-making.
Introduction
Decision-making is a high-level cognitive process, including the comparison and evaluation of alternative options, which takes up certain cognitive resources and is the core component of human intelligence activity (Amit et al., 2011) . Decision-making is part of process of problem solving that refers to the whole process of exploration, judgment, evaluation and final selection of action targets and means. Decisionmaking refers to the process of evaluating and selecting alternative options (Bayer et al., 2005) . This definition is widely used in the fields of management, behavioral decision-making with great influence.
In real life, there are usually two decisionmaking situations. One is a deterministic situation, where the alternative options are determined and individuals can make judgment and decisionmaking based on their subjective value requirements. For example, people will hesitate to drink water or drink tea in a teahouse. The other one is an uncertain situation, in which the centralized alternative options are uncertain, that is, the objective value or probability of each option is uncertain or both are uncertain. For example, the amount of money and the probability of winning a lottery are uncertain. It is obvious that in our real life, people are more uncertain about decisionmaking in situations.
In addition to the traditional decisionmaking that can be divided into risk decisionmaking and fuzzy decision-making in an uncertain situation, there is another form of decision-making, namely "accept or give up" decision-making. From the perspective of content, there are differences between risk decision-making and fuzzy decisionmaking as follows. In risk decision-making, the probability of occurrence of events can be predicted by individuals while in fuzzy decision-making, the probability of occurrence of events cannot be estimated by individuals. Nevertheless, there is a common feature between the two, that is, in the face of two or more homogeneous alternative options, decision makers need to compare and evaluate these alternative options, and then make a choice, called preference decision-making that best suits their own value needs based on their own subjective probabilities or needs (Bechara et al., 2000) . For example, in a round of gambling game, there are two options: big or small, and people will first evaluate the winning probability of big and small, and then make a choice. However, before making a choice, people need to determine whether they are willing to take part in this gamble based on their own subjective or objective probability, and potency, namely, accept or give up gamble. If the decision-maker thinks that gamble is a very risky thing and the probability of losing money is great, then he or she may give up gamble; if the decision-maker thinks that the value (potency) of gamble is considerable, then he or she may accept gamble, and then consider the choice of big or small. In that same way, if there are two stocks A and B to choose from, people will first evaluate which stock is likely to appreciate, and then make a decision on buying A or B. However, before making this decision, people will also make a decision to whether to buy the stick or not based on their subjective or objective probability and potency. If the decision-maker thinks that the risk of buying a stock is too great and it is better to save the money in the bank, he or she will not face the question of buying A or B; if the decisionmaker thinks that although buying a stock has certain risk, A and B shares are stocks with certain potential and the return will be very rich, then he or she will face the question of choosing A or B again (Fan et al., 2011) .
Experimental part
The purpose of this study is to explore the cognitive and neural mechanisms in economic decision-making. In the field of economic decision-making, most of the previous researches explore the cognitive neural mechanism of economic decision-making from the perspective of probability, potency and expected value, including fixing probability but changing potency, fixing potency but changing probability, synchronously changing probability and potency but keeping the expected value and the reference value equal (Insabato et al., 2010) . On this basis, this study focuses on manipulating the change of probability and potency so that the expected value and the reference value form three conditions: greater than, smaller than, and equal to, and then explores the cognitive and neural mechanisms of "accept or give up" decisionmaking in economic decision-making. Based on previous studies, the reference value of this study is 3 yuan (hereinafter referred to as 3, that is, if we choose to give up gamble, we can get the fixed 3 yuan). According to the orthogonal design of probability and potency, three experimental conditions can be formed by synchronously changing the two: expected value = reference value, expected value < reference value, expected value > reference value.
41 college students from Southwest University participate in the experiment as paid subjects, including 14 males and 27 females with an average age of 21.68 ± 1.08 years old. Their age ranges from 19 to 24 years old. All subjects are right-handed, physically and psychologically healthy with normal vision or corrected vision. They are all willing to participate in the experiment.
Results and discussion
Cognitive mechanism in economic decision-making This study explores the cognitive mechanism in the decision-making process by manipulating the objective probability and potency of economic decision-making. The subjects choose to "accept" or "give up" gamble according to their own wishes. This study uses SPSS 16.0 statistical software package to carry on statistical analysis to the data. The average acceptance rate of subjects under various experimental conditions is shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . As can be seen from the figure, the black line in the middle shows the acceptance rate of all subjects under each test condition when the expected value is equal to the reference value. Theoretically, the acceptance rate under such an experimental condition is not high because the expected value of the choice to accept gamble is equal to the determined reference value of the choice to give up gamble. It can be seen from the entire orthogonal design that only in the case of extreme value (for example, the top left corner indicates that both probability and potency are high, and the lower right corner shows that the probability and potency are both low), the response of subjects meets the theoretical expectation. Most of experiments (especially the black line with the same expected value as the central axis, most of the region from the lower left corner to the top right corner) are inconsistent with the theoretical expectation (Kalisch et al., 2006) . This shows that the choice of subjects is contrary to rational economic decision-making.
As can be seen from Figure 3 , when the expected value is equal to the reference value, the average acceptance rate of subjects increases with the increase of the probability, and the two have a significant positive correlation (n=0.948, p<.001); under the condition that the expected value is smaller than the reference value, the average acceptance rate increases with the increase of the probability, and the two have a significant positive correlation (r=0.968, p<.001). Under the condition that the expected value is greater than the reference value, the average acceptance rate increases with the increase of the probability, and the two have a significant positive correlation (r=0.952, p<.001). Figure 4 is the average response time of subjects to "accept" and "give up". The decision-making level (accept / give up) is taken as the independent variable, and the decision-king response time is taken as the dependent variable for the difference test. The results show that the difference is very significant (Ff/.2Cj=/S.29 (5, P=0.000), and the average response of "accept" decision-making is significantly longer than that of "give up" decision-making. This indicates that, subjects need more time to think when making the "accept" decision-making when the expected value is smaller than the reference value (Rao et al., 2011) . After the functional image is standardized by Talairach coordinate space, "accept" decisionmaking and "give up" decision-making are analyzed based on voxels. The results show that when the "accept" decision-making subtracts the "give up" decision-making, the positive activated brain regions include right inferior frontal gyrus (BA9), left / right insula (BA13), left / right lingual gyrus (BA18), right anterior cuneiform lobe (BA7), right thalamus, right middle frontal gyrus (BA6), left caudate nucleus, left parietal lobule (BA7), left inferior temporal gyrus (BA37); negative activated brain regions include right inferior temporal gyrus (BA38), left / right cuneus (BA18), left PCC (BA31), left ACC (BA32). The corresponding Brodmann partition, activation voxels, peak Talairach coordinate and statistical test values of the brain activated region are shown in Table 1 . This suggests that these brain regions are very sensitive to the decisionmaking response in such uncertain economic decision-making. In this study, the region of interest (ROI) focuses on the right insula and the left inferior temporal gyrus. The ROI is automatically drawn based on the correlation analysis between the acceptance rate and the activated brain region. To further examine the difference in activation intensity between "accept" and "give up" decision-making responses, we perform a time series analysis of signal changes on the right insula and left inferior temporal gyrus (Vandenberghe et al., 2012) . A comparison of the time-signal intensity curves of the right insula (BA13) of accepting decisionmaking and giving up decision-making is shown in Figure 5 . It can be seen from Figure 5 that the activation intensity of the right insula (BA13) is significantly greater than that of giving up decision, which also indicates that the right insula (BA13) participates more when accept decisionmaking is conducted. 
Neural mechanism in economic decision-making

Conclusions and outlook
Economic decision-making, as a very common psychological phenomenon, is a common component in real life and is related to every aspect of everyday life.
In the whole decision-making process of "accept or give up", the individual decisionmaking behavior violates the rational economic decision-making theory. Under different conditions, the individual's weighing criterion is different. When the expected value is greater than or equal to the reference value, the probability has more influence on the individual's decision-making, and when the expected value is smaller than the expected value, the individual is more inclined to consider the probability and the potency (i.e. the expected value) simultaneously. In the "accept or give up" decision-making process, multiple brain regions are activated. Among them, the brain activation data of the superior parietal and ACC can be well fitted with the behavior data (acceptance rate) under the condition of high, middle and low probability, which indicates that the two brain regions may be sensitive regions of the probability evaluation. The brain activation data of PCC can be fitted well with the behavior data (acceptance rate) under the condition of high, middle and low potency, which indicates that it may be a sensitive brain region for potency evaluation. The negative emotion produced by insula plays an important role in decision-making.
